Imagination and Humanity in Kant and Arendt

This paper examines the role of imagination in defining human and intersubjective experience through an analysis of Immanuel Kant’s aesthetic judgment in the Critique of the Power of Judgment and Hannah Arendt’s interpretation in Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, which extends imagination into the political and moral sphere. The paper focuses on the connection between imagination, common sense, and universal communicability as essential components in defining humanity. First, I examine imagination’s unique freedom in Kant’s aesthetic judgment and demonstrate how it enables a distinctive form of general agreement that transcends subjective experience without being grounded on objective conceptual definition. I argue that this agreement represents not merely an aspect of aesthetic experience but a fundamental characteristic of human nature itself. Subsequently, I focus on Arendt’s reading of Kant that positions aesthetic judgment as key to understanding political judgment. Arendt concentrates on how imagination enables “broad-minded thinking” – the ability to consider others’ perspectives as necessary for valid political judgment. Through this reading, Arendt reveals how Kantian aesthetic judgment’s structure can serve as a model for political judgment, where we must mediate between the particular and the general without predetermined rules.

Through analyzing imagination’s significance in Kant and Arendt, I show how imagination bridges subjective and shared human experience, clarifying the connection between aesthetic and political judgment. I argue that although Arendt’s reading is sometimes perceived as departing from Kant’s aesthetic doctrine, it remains faithful to its basic characteristics, in particular, how he connected aesthetic to moral judgment. This analysis reveals imagination’s significance not only as a cognitive faculty but as a fundamental condition for human community and moral life.