Finding One’s Way in Language: Orientation in Wittgenstein’s Later Thought

In Philosophical Investigations, section 123, Wittgenstein writes: “A philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way about.’” This depiction, which employs a spatial metaphor to describe philosophical problems and suggests how we should approach them, is central to a network of spatial imagery found throughout the Investigations and Wittgenstein’s later and middle-period philosophy. The concept of finding one’s way in language as a means of resolving philosophical problems, along with the extensive use of spatial metaphors related to language and Wittgenstein’s method of inquiry, invites us to consider how we should interpret the spatial analogy in his writings. What insights does this analogy offer regarding our understanding of language, and how does it shape our view of grammatical investigation? In this paper, I argue that the metaphor of orientation embodies a fundamental human relationship to language—the way we can feel either at home or out of place within it. Grammatical investigation, as a method of orientation, is not about charting a static grammar of our language but about engaging in movement within a dynamic, ever-changing environment. This movement reveals the intricate interplay between familiarity and estrangement, motion and stability, and the tension between confidence and anxiety that defines our existence within language.