As is well known, there is a fundamental link between Spinoza’s conception of modality, which attains its mature form in the Ethics, and the core of Spinoza’s substance metaphysics. The necessitarian view of reality, occasioned by this linkage, as well as the conflict this view has stirred in critics and followers alike, has been prominent within Spinoza’s philosophical legacy. The article examines the meaning of the thesis of necessitarianism as well as the attempt to demonstrate it in the Ethics in light of the unique view of modality the work presents. Special attention is given to the idea that within the bounds of Spinoza’s metaphysics, logical or formal impossibility is neither equivalent nor necessarily leading to nonsense or inconceivability, and so essences or definitions that include contradiction are still considered as essences. Or, that the essence of that which is contradictory is not “nothing at all,” but is rather minimally distinct, even though its actual existence, for Spinoza, is strictly impossible. From this perspective, a surprising view of the distinction between impossibility and nonsense or inconceivability unfolds, and a clear examination of a relatively neglected question becomes possible: namely, does something like the limits of sense appear from within Spinoza’s philosophical project? And if so, in what form?        

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