In the last lecture series Michel Foucault delivered at the Collègede France, his retrospective view on the development of his thought as a whole, he distinguishes between three irreducibly distinct elements that are nevertheless constitutive of each other. These are: forms of knowledge taken as modes of veridiction; relations of power as forms of governing conduct; modes of forming subjects as practices of the self (Foucault 2011, 9). This article studies the conception of “life” in Foucault’s works from the point of view of these three elements. It aims to contribute to the literature a shift in discussions concerning Foucault’s conception of life, from an over emphasis on the political element (biopolitics), to a more balanced and illuminating account that recalibrates the political with respect to the epistemic (already in the early work) and the ethical-aesthetic (in the late work) dimension of life. I focus on some juxtapositions of these elements to argue for the need of a more robust conception of “life” in Foucault’s works.

Tel-Aviv University