The traditional attitude, popular among both ordinary people and philosophers, is that the end of humanity would be a disaster and tragedy, especially if it turns out that there are no other intelligent beings in the universe. The world itself would lose much of its value, and human beings who would live under the threat of such a total extinction would lose the meaning of their life. This position is supported both by utilitarian reasons, having to do with the value of promoting the overall happiness in the world, and by other reasons, such as the value of the realization of humanity’s potential (progress), or by the analogy of the individual, who strives to prolong her life, to humanity, which values its indefinite continuation. The present article criticizes the traditional view from the position of a “person-affecting approach,” according to which any value is dependent on the existence of valuers (human beings) and that in their absence there is no sense to questions about the value of the world. It also proposes that the meaning of life is not dependent on the existence of human beings beyond a few generations and that the meaning of our life is not undermined by the fact that humanity will become extinct in a million years’ time.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem